In stark contrast...

The case of the Nile River is a myriad of complexities, inconsistencies and futile treaties. Unlike the case of the Okavango river there has historically been many treaties of which are still in effect today and affect the ability to conserve and manage the Nile's resources equitably. 

The series of colonial-era agreements that exist on the nile are out of the scope of this blog however two of the most cited agreements that have significant impacts include the 1929 exchange of notes between the British and Egyptian government in regard to use of the River Nile for irrigation purposes. The other important agreement is the 1959 agreement between the Republic of Sudan and Egypt allowing the full utilisation of Nile Waters. The latter agreement is a renegotiation of the 1929 agreement terms. Other riparian states are not included in this and it essentially entitles Sudan and Egypt to unrestricted use of Nile waters. As described previously, this historical context provides unprecedented complications to the Nile situation that is yet to be resolved, understandably other riparian states have contested the status of these agreements.

I have a strong stance on the effectiveness of UN and International Law on the peaceful cooperation of states within a transboundary river basin. I do not wish to discuss in detail the flaws of these international laws and how they are futile in impacting the situation with the Nile Basin however i will briefly describe what they entail and why I feel strongly about them. The 1996 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers was introduced at the 52nd International Law Association conference in Helsinki. The Helsinki Rules assert the rights of all bordering nations to an equitable share in the water resources with "reasonable consideration" of factors such as past uses. It consists of 37 articles spread over 6 chapters and is full of wordy ineffective statements such as "each basin state is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin."

The Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses stems from the spineless Helsinki Rules but with the intention on including both surface and groundwater and being more mindful of increasing demands of water and anthropogenic behaviour. once again the language used in this law has been criticised for the way it has been worded and its controversial nature. McCaffrey (1999) specifically criticises the statement 'in utilising an international watercourse in their territories... take all appropriate measures to preventive causing of significant harm to other watercourse states" and uses the following hypothetical case to illustrate his point that conflict could occur from a state having legitimate uses for a watercourse in its nation that can negatively impact other nations

"Suppose ... upstream State A has not significantly developed its water resources because of its mountainous terrain. The topography of the downstream states on the watercourse, B and C, is flatter, and they have used the watercourse extensively for irrigation for centuries, if not millennia. State A now wishes to develop its water resources for hydroelectric and agricultural purposes. States B and C cry foul, on the ground that this would significantly harm their established uses."

As emphasised by McCaffrey and many others, these international laws are simply not applicable to the heterogenous nature of transboundary river basins, the states involved, past agreements, historical and colonial contexts and many other factors.  

On a more aggregate level the Nile Basin Initiative was introduced as a partnership among Nile riparian states in 1999. I will look at this closer in my upcoming blog post and assess to what extent this has been more useful at coordinating cooperative efforts and moving forward from colonial agreements. 

OKACOM and the Okavango basin

Many highlight the ability of treaties to govern utilisation and reduce conflict potential by fostering collaboration between the riparians of the Okavango basin. However treaties have for various reasons been criticised for their vague and lucid nature, and as a result in a lot of cases have proven to be ineffective at encouraging collaboration between states. This blog post will look at OKACOM and its widely claimed effective impacts on collaborative adaptive management in terms of institutional and ecological resilience. 

A key focus for the parties of the Okavango basin are the environmental needs, and these according to Green et al. (2013) are of higher importance than the domestic needs, the delta rich with wildlife provides a massive source of tourist income, with the region widely being acknowledged for its ecotourist appeal. The threat of development on the river would pose significant impacts on critical sediment transported channel shifting that is essential to biodiversity and fertility. There are several treaties that serve to foster collaboration and sustainable use of the resources of the Okavango. First of all there is the 1994 agreement between the governments of Angola, Botswana and Namibia on the establishment of a Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM). With three delegations representing the contacting parties, the functions of the commission outlined in the agreement states, as an example, "the prevention of pollution of water resources and the control over aquatic weeds in the Okavango River Basin." Whilst the agreement outlines specific tasks to ensure the sustainability of the basin the agreement is sparse and lacking detail and substance. Thirteen years later a similar agreement came into force that establishes three separate branches of OKACOM: hydrological, biodiversity and institutional task forces (OKACOM, 2007). Once more, this agreement emphasises the need for "equitable allocation" of resources, yet thus far has struggled to quantify and allocate such resources due to ongoing demand and supply evaluations and council formations (OKACOM 2010). Beyond this there are other frameworks that operate to encourage cooperation, such as the 2010 Protocol on Hydrological Data Sharing for the Okavango River Basin, which exists to provide accurate information on floods droughts and pollution magnitudes. This aspect is intrinsically linked to OKASEC which feeds back to OKACOM.  What we can understand from this is that there is a centralisation of the agreements and taskforces whom operate for the region as a whole. I agree with academics such as Green et al. 2013 that this is a fundamentally positive aspect to managing the resources within the basin. 

It is important to mention the multi-scalar nature of treaties and fostering riparian collaboration. In the case of the Okavango basin, crucially there is the strong framework of OKACOM, that despite resigning itself to the occasional vague use of words, has been relatively effective thus far at keeping relations peaceful between the countries and honing in the priorities of the basin, namely to environmental protection and the sustaining of ecotourism within the region. However, as I will discuss in upcoming posts, it is the interplay between local, regional and international interests that has enabled OKACOM to so far be successful. It will be interesting to see however, when the allocation regime is established within the region, what impacts this will have on the so far smooth collaborative work that has been done. 

The Nile and Okavango Basins

In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said: “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”

The Nile river of East Africa is the worlds longest river stretching 6,700km and passing through 10 African countries (International Rivers, 2015) [Figure 1.]. An estimated 300 million people live within these 10 basin countries with 160 million of these depending on the river for their livelihoods (El Fadel et al., 2000) [see Table 1]. Since the course of the river Nile stretches broadly speaking from north to south, there is a climatic gradient meaning there are inter riparian differences in climatic conditions (Kameri-Mbote, 2007). The Nile has a rich history and cultural significance, meaning a varied significance of the river to each riparian. Dependence on the Nile is further non uniform, Sudan and Egypt rely almost completely on the Nile for their water resources due to colonial and historical narratives Tafesse, 2001). In the case of Egypt, the ancient claim to rights doesn’t fit exactly the idea of sovereign integrity but its natural historical right is deemed above all the most important for Egyptian interests. Despite this, in terms of contribution to the Nile, Ethiopia’s tributaries supply about 85% of the Nile, which has caused conflict between the two countries in terms of rights (Chatteri, 2002). The intriguing dynamic and narratives of the main countries that use the Nile is the main reason for such interest in this river basin. Is there capacity for cooperation between these countries or are conflicts in interests and perceived rights going to ultimately lead to a future resource war?

Country	Population 1995 (millions)	Population 2025 (millions)	GNP per capita 1996 (US $)	Population below the poverty line (1US$/day) (PPP) (%)	Per capita water availability 1990 (m³)	Per capita water availability 2025 (m³)
Burundi	6.4	13.5	170		655	269
DRC	43.9	104.6	160		359,803	139,309
Egypt	62.9	97.3	1,090	7.6	1,123	630
Ethiopia	55.1	126.9	100	33.8	2,207	842
Eritrea	?	?	?	?	?	?
Kenya	28.8	63.4	320	50.2	636	235
Rwanda	8	15.8	190	45.7	897	306
Sudan	28.1	58.4			4,792	1,993
Tanzania	29.7	62.9	170	16.4	2,924	1,025
Uganda	21.3	48.1	300	50	3,759	1,437

Table 1. Nile river riparians (source: Chatteri et al. 2002)

 Figure 1. Nile River Basin (source: The World Bank)

My second case study is a much less written about but still important river, the Okavango river which flows through three countries (Angola, Namibia and Botswana) [Figure 2.]. With this case study the actors involved are fewer but does this mean the capacity for cohesion and collaboration in sustainable use of this river is enhanced or are things equally as complex as with the River Nile? By analyzing two different sized rivers from two different areas of Africa, we can begin to look at the different factors that influence cooperation or indeed conflict and get a broader yet focused view of water conflict in Africa. Like with the Nile, the Okavango river is essential for sustaining the livelihoods of those that live within the catchment but also for inundation of the Okavango wetlands that sustains rich and diverse wildlife (Ashton, 2000). Both catchments provide interesting dynamics in which will prove interesting to investigate over the coming weeks.

Figure 2. Okavango River Basin (source: radsmithillustration.com)

In my upcoming posts, I will look at international law and multilateral agreements and how far they have gone in encouraging cooperation and cohesion. I will then look at current and future developments on these river courses that could potentially cause conflict.

Before I complete this second post however I would like to state my opinion on something that is regularly brought up in literature regarding past transboundary water resource conflicts. Many academics raise historical facts to explain why future conflict is very unlikely to happen. I personally do not think reasoning such as ‘instances of cooperation between riparian nations outnumbered conflicts by more than 2-to-1 between 1945 and 1999’ (Wolf et al., 2003) can justify the claim that future resource wars are unlikely. Especially when one considers the potential impacts of climate change on precipitation variability and increased PET to name just a few (IPCC, 2015) on river runoff and consequently the human ramifications that result from this. Though just yet, my exploration of literature around this hasn’t been extensive just yet, I would still note that claims such as the one by President Sadat in 1979, could very much be realized.

An introduction...

In this first blog post my aim is to introduce the broad topic of this blog and narrow its scope such that the following posts are more concise and focussed.

Approximately 40% of the world's population live within basins that expand over 2 or more countries (UN-Water, 2015). This figure could be considered modest when compared to the estimation that 90% of all Africa's surface freshwater resources are located in river basins consisting of two or more countries (UNDP, 2006). This raises huge concerns around how these resources are divided equally between states and extracted sustainability, in a continent where climate change and population growth are likely to exacerbate existing issues (Goulden, et al., 2009).

The contentious aspects of transboundary water resources, how they are being managed and by whom are the main motivation for this topic choice. It must be highlighted that there is vast literature that exists covering many different aspects of this topic. In this blog, I will focus on one water resource (surface water) in two different basins (TBA) to ensure a focussed outlook on the capacity for cooperation instead of conflict is formed. The kinds of questions I will be asking are:

• Are existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on fair use of water resources doing enough to prevent conflict?
• Is the optimism of academics such as Wolf (1998) claiming the costs of war and benefits of cooperation mean the latter is the inevitable result of issues around equitable and sustainable resource consumption?
• How do the two characterisations of riparian debates: territorial sovereignty and riverine integrity, fit the narratives of individual countries in the two basins.
• Whom is most important/has the most potential to act in resolving current issues and future ones induced by population growth, climate change and other factors.

Whilst this is not a complete list, it gives some insight into how I shall structure my blog posts over the coming weeks. In preparation and in brainstorming ideas for how to structure my blog, I read a very comprehensive and broad paper by Goulden et al. (2009) which reviewed literature surrounding the limits barriers and opportunities for adaption to climate change in international river basins in Africa. This article highlighted the broadness and the complexity of the issue, even down to the definitions of 'cooperation' and 'conflict'. Discussing aspects like these are out of the scope of this blog, however, the article, whilst being overly focussed on rather speculative estimations of climate change impacts on already speculative estimations of water stress and availability, provides a sound basis to further narrow down an aspect or area of interest in this debate.

Climate change is not my primary focus for this blog, I justify this on the basis that there is a lack of adaptability to current water resource sharing requirements and I believe looking at fixes to the contemporary issues interests me more than merely speculating about conflict/cohesion many decades into the future. 

My personal approach, before I jump into this project is one of caution, for both the alarmists and the optimists. I believe that currently there are no general grounds to swing one way or the other and as with most political/social/physical aspects of Africa, differing time space actors and institutions involved creates huge heterogeneity between basins. Through the lens of my two basin examples, I wish to compare and contrast their experiences and look at current ways that issues of sharing are being dealt with. By the end of this string of blogs, I hope to be able to reflect on my initial opinions and see if they have been reinforced or altered by my findings.

My following post shall introduce the two basins I wish to investigate.