The Nile and Okavango Basins

In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said: “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”

The Nile river of East Africa is the worlds longest river stretching 6,700km and passing through 10 African countries (International Rivers, 2015) [Figure 1.]. An estimated 300 million people live within these 10 basin countries with 160 million of these depending on the river for their livelihoods (El Fadel et al., 2000) [see Table 1]. Since the course of the river Nile stretches broadly speaking from north to south, there is a climatic gradient meaning there are inter riparian differences in climatic conditions (Kameri-Mbote, 2007). The Nile has a rich history and cultural significance, meaning a varied significance of the river to each riparian. Dependence on the Nile is further non uniform, Sudan and Egypt rely almost completely on the Nile for their water resources due to colonial and historical narratives Tafesse, 2001). In the case of Egypt, the ancient claim to rights doesn’t fit exactly the idea of sovereign integrity but its natural historical right is deemed above all the most important for Egyptian interests. Despite this, in terms of contribution to the Nile, Ethiopia’s tributaries supply about 85% of the Nile, which has caused conflict between the two countries in terms of rights (Chatteri, 2002). The intriguing dynamic and narratives of the main countries that use the Nile is the main reason for such interest in this river basin. Is there capacity for cooperation between these countries or are conflicts in interests and perceived rights going to ultimately lead to a future resource war?

Country	Population 1995 (millions)	Population 2025 (millions)	GNP per capita 1996 (US $)	Population below the poverty line (1US$/day) (PPP) (%)	Per capita water availability 1990 (m³)	Per capita water availability 2025 (m³)
Burundi	6.4	13.5	170		655	269
DRC	43.9	104.6	160		359,803	139,309
Egypt	62.9	97.3	1,090	7.6	1,123	630
Ethiopia	55.1	126.9	100	33.8	2,207	842
Eritrea	?	?	?	?	?	?
Kenya	28.8	63.4	320	50.2	636	235
Rwanda	8	15.8	190	45.7	897	306
Sudan	28.1	58.4			4,792	1,993
Tanzania	29.7	62.9	170	16.4	2,924	1,025
Uganda	21.3	48.1	300	50	3,759	1,437

Table 1. Nile river riparians (source: Chatteri et al. 2002)

 Figure 1. Nile River Basin (source: The World Bank)

My second case study is a much less written about but still important river, the Okavango river which flows through three countries (Angola, Namibia and Botswana) [Figure 2.]. With this case study the actors involved are fewer but does this mean the capacity for cohesion and collaboration in sustainable use of this river is enhanced or are things equally as complex as with the River Nile? By analyzing two different sized rivers from two different areas of Africa, we can begin to look at the different factors that influence cooperation or indeed conflict and get a broader yet focused view of water conflict in Africa. Like with the Nile, the Okavango river is essential for sustaining the livelihoods of those that live within the catchment but also for inundation of the Okavango wetlands that sustains rich and diverse wildlife (Ashton, 2000). Both catchments provide interesting dynamics in which will prove interesting to investigate over the coming weeks.

Figure 2. Okavango River Basin (source: radsmithillustration.com)

In my upcoming posts, I will look at international law and multilateral agreements and how far they have gone in encouraging cooperation and cohesion. I will then look at current and future developments on these river courses that could potentially cause conflict.

Before I complete this second post however I would like to state my opinion on something that is regularly brought up in literature regarding past transboundary water resource conflicts. Many academics raise historical facts to explain why future conflict is very unlikely to happen. I personally do not think reasoning such as ‘instances of cooperation between riparian nations outnumbered conflicts by more than 2-to-1 between 1945 and 1999’ (Wolf et al., 2003) can justify the claim that future resource wars are unlikely. Especially when one considers the potential impacts of climate change on precipitation variability and increased PET to name just a few (IPCC, 2015) on river runoff and consequently the human ramifications that result from this. Though just yet, my exploration of literature around this hasn’t been extensive just yet, I would still note that claims such as the one by President Sadat in 1979, could very much be realized.