The Great Renaissance Dam

A very current ongoing area of debate and tension is the prospect of the Grand Renaissance Dam (or the Millennium Dam as it is sometimes referred to). The dam is currently under production and seeks to bring hydroelectric power to Ethiopia by harnessing Blue Nile's waters. Upon completion, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, and as expected Egypt has been strongly against the project as it believes the dam will reduce water temporarily with the filling of the dam and with the effects of long term evaporative losses. Further tho this there could lead to a permanent lowering of water levels in Lake Nasser which on one hand would reduce the evaporative losses from the body of water but will also reduce the ability of the Aswan High Dam to produce hydropower.

Dialogue between concerned Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt has been ongoing for the last 5 years and has been tumultuous at best. Beginning with an International Panel of Experts to review and assess the impacts of the dam, data sharing and collaborative efforts looked to mirror positives of Integrated Water Resources Management, however reports produced by Ethiopia and Egypt ended up differing, in reflection of their interests. In 2013 tensions reached new heights when Egyptian political leaders unknowingly discussed methods on television to destroy the dam whilst discussing the International Panel of Experts report mentioned above with President Morsi. After the meeting Morsi highlighted the embarrassment and promoted "good neighbourliness" however not ruling out conflict in a later speech as "Egypt's water security cannot be violated at all."

After numerous cessations of talks then renegotiating according to some reports an agreement may be reached "on some points" very soon. The most recent talks that have occurred this month, with technical talks taking place the last few days, with reported agreements on studying the impacts of the dam. So after 10 rounds of talks over the past 2 years, it seems that there may be some agreements in principal on the horizon for the project. However, given the up and down nature of talks over the past few years it would be good not to get too optimistic.

This case demonstrates the fragility of relations between the riparian nations, especially Egypt and any country that threatens its water supply from the Nile. It further exemplifies that cooperation is possible but that it occurs over a very lengthy and strenuous amount of time, with conflict still being an outside possibility.

BAR Event Intensity Scale and Basins at Risk

A well known way to categorise the degree of cooperation/competition in a transboundary basin is assigning a level on the BAR event intensity scale. The BAR project was a contribution from UNESCO's International Hydrological Programme and the final product; a database grading all events over the period of 1948-99 was produced by some of the leading academics in the area of transboundary water conflict Aaron Wolf, Shira Yoffe and Mark Giordano. In addition to this, they used the information they compiled to predict the basins at greatest risk of dispute in the near future (5-10 years). I allured to this study in my previous post and thought it required some further investigation.

In creating this intricate database, it involved the compilation and assessment of biophysical, socioeconomic and geopolitical data utilising GIS to determine indicators for future tensions. With all this data and varied sources, the BAR event intensity scale was produced (Table 1).

Table 1. BAR event intensity scale (Source: UNESCO)

The findings from such analysis highlighted the lack of extremes (extreme conflict and extreme cooperation) (Figure 1), that most interactions were cooperative and most mild in intensity, and that the major water related issues are over quantity and infrastructure.

Figure 1. Number events by BAR scale (Source: UNESCO)

Though the data certainly seems to indicate patterns of which this article stresses, I would question a few aspects of their findings and the way they categorise their BAR event intensity. Firstly, they emphasise the lack of conflict in their findings, however though there hasn't been forms of extreme conflict >25% of their events were conflictual of some sort, so it exists, and this number could be even higher if one was to update the dataset for 2015 in the face of Africa's increasing population boom, continuing struggle over resources and impacts of increased climate variability. Another aspect I'd critique is regarding an International Water Treaty as the second highest form of cooperation. As is well known, and demonstrated in some of my previous posts, this does not necessarily mean there is strong widespread cooperation within the basin. In addition to this, as allured to in my previous post, their predictions of basins which are likely to produce conflict in the next 5-10 years (aka 5-10 years ago) have not been entirely accurate, exemplified in the case of the Okavango. 

While frameworks to differentiate between levels of conflict and cooperation such as this one can sometimes be useful, they are based on a number of assumptions that in a lot of cases do not encapsulate the heterogeneity of transboundary river basins.

Water conflict and cooperation literature: A review

An interesting journal article published just recently has scrutinised literature from the past 25 years on water conflict and cooperation highlighting areas that require future investigation and calling for an adjustment to the approaches to studies on water resource conflict. I will discuss a few interesting points it stresses in this blog post.

The article highlights 2 significant waves of literature, while it isnt ideal to categorize the author does actually encapsulate the changing literature on water conflict. Wave 1 starts in the 1990s with the neomalthusian rhetoric of concerns relating water conflict to population, poverty and environmental degredation. Wave 2 begins in the early 2000s initiated this time by questions of climate change and adaptive capacity. Though this is a good way to view the changing paradigms in water resource literature over the past 20 years on Africa, it ignores that there is a significant quantity of literature published before 1980 on water resource conflict.

A second claim made by the article is that the idea of 'basins at risk' is not a fixed but fluid concept. This is a just idea when one considers that Wolf et al. 2003 highlighted that the Okavango basin is likely to see an 'escalation in conflict' in the next 5-10 years. This has yet to materialise and emphasises the dynamic constantly changing and unpredictable nature of basin status.

Another interesting aspect is the common conception in literature that conflict is bad and to be avoided and that cooperation is good. A good example used in the article is the Orange-Senqu cooperation that occured only after conflict via a coop d'etat. This links to the idea that conflict and cooperation occur simultaneously and in a variety of forms, Furlong et al emphasised the contradictory nature of cooperation between states whereby regional peace obscures the subnational violence that could be occuring. Other academics such as Mirumachi and Homer-Dixon also share these beliefs.

This is part of a wider absense of studies on subnational scale conflict or cooperation, obscurred by the focus on interstate relations and general basinwide categorization as being in conflict or cooperative. The article alludes to a need to find a way to intergrate the fascination of potential for interstate conflict with real time numerous and persistent conflcits that exist within states - this is what he suggests as a third wave of more nuanced and sophisticated studies.

As I read this article, I found the critiques outlined to be rather sobering when I consider how I have looked at the Okavango and Nile basins. The extensive one dimensional literature on these transboundary basins have encouraged me to categorize the basin as either in cooperation or in conflict, ignoring both subnational and further aggregate dynamics. Overall, the article makes an interesting read and in my opinion is thought provoking critical synthesis of literature over the past 20 years on transboundary water conflict.

Struggle Over the Nile - Documentary

A very interesting geopolitical outlook on tensions over the Nile's waters. It offers insight into the different positions of each riparian country, their interests and how these conflict. The video is 1/3 videos created in the series by Al Jazeera, however I believe this to be the most informative and relevant.

Sold Up The River?

An interesting piece on hydro power proposals on the Okavango discusses the tradeoffs between domestic and developmental needs and the needs for conserving the rich soon to be UNESCO World Heritage Site that is Botswana's Okavango Delta.

A proposed large scale hydro-electric weir at Popa Falls on the Okavango River. This comes from Namibia's desperate need to develop self sufficient power generation infrastructure, such that they no longer need to import over 50% of their energy from South Africa. As population is fastly growing and there have been some signs of development in the region, demand is increasingly outstripping supply and widespread outages and infrastructural limitations are hampering potential economic growth. Namibia has been exploring this possiblity since 1969, however thanks to public outcry and frequent stakeholder meetings this project has been indefinitely delayed.

The article outlines numerous impacts that could result from implementation of the weir such as

- signficant reductions in water flow and natural variability

- interuption of sediment flow downstream

- migrational routes of elephants and fish disturbed

- inundation of houses, schools, riverine forest leading to loss of habitat and destablising communities

- inundation leading to increased prevalence of malaria and bilharzia

Though alarmist, as the project will unlikely get moving any time soon. It does emphasise the difficulty of a trade off between economic growth needs and preserving ecologically important areas. Written from the perspective of an ecologist, it does make very ambitious and unrealistic claims such as "we need to limit water abstraction to household demand throughout the Kavango Basin." The fact that NamPower with the oversight of OKACOM first produced a feasibility study then invited stakeholder participation in debating matters shows the effectiveness of the Integrated Water Resource Management that occurs in this basin. This project is unlikely to ever occur should the current successful implementation of IWRM continue.

Virtual Water - A Potential Solution?

There are some academics whom posit that the primary reason for the lack of water conflict is due to the economic system of trading basic staple goods (such as wheat) which operate to advantage of water and food deficit countries (Allan, 1997; Le Heron, 1995). What I want to consider in this post is whether it is a viable solution to water shortages within the Nile basin in the future?

A highly influential paper by Allan (1997) certainly makes this claim, highlighting that “more water ‘flows’ into the Middle East each year as ‘virtual water’ than flows down the Nile into Egypt for agriculture” is the solution to the transboundary water issue within the Nile Basin. The paper also goes far to emphasises a perception change is necessary and this will lead to a policy change that will actively implement the idea of virtual water.

Allan makes some really interesting points about perceptions and how this has actively worked against effective policy solutions to water shortage in North Africa and the Middle East. He also goes to define what “sufficient” means to different actors and how varying interpretations has led to a lack of scientific imperative. This provides an interesting framework with which to look at why effective policies have been few and far between in managing the Nile’s resources sustainably. The basic claim he makes is a lack of blue water in North Africa could be accounted for by green water in humid regions which is generally taken for granted. The analysis provided in this paper emphasises the need to look on an international scale, not merely national or basinwide which it criticises its neglect of the market. He highlights that national economies operate within international systems and that transboundary water issues should be considered in “problemsheds” and not just within the hydrological boundaries (watersheds). I believe the key points made by Allan are important, integration and effective use of virtual water could be important in the future for ensuring water and food security within the Nile basin. Instead of large scale irrigation that operates primarily in Egypt, these products could be imported saving substantial amounts of water that would be better used for domestic consumption. Since 69% of water is used for agriculture and only 13% for domestic purposes a shift in the priorities of the Nile’s water towards domestic consumption could resolve insecurity over access to clean safe water especially when in the face of climate change and population growth.

“it is economic systems and not hydrological and water engineering systems which achieve water security for the economies of the region.”

The main issue with an argument such as this one is the neglect of social aspects. By thinking about economical solutions such as with virtual water one ignores the existing reason for widespread agriculture within Egypt: sustaining livelihoods and a rich cultural and historical background of staple production within the region. If virtual water was a potential solution for the Nile issue, who decides who has the right to use Nile waters and who should import to offset the water demands of production? Further to this, why should agricultural production be lowered in priority due to alternatives when technically speaking there are also alternatives to the hydroelectric interests of Ethiopia, such as solar energy which could be feasible in this region. I feel it is optimistic to make the claim that virtual water is the solution to water resource conflict in the future, though I do see its value in offsetting the demands placed on the Nile’s water by large scale agriculture

Nile Basin Initiative

Basin wide initiatives in the Nile Basin have been largely unsuccessful. The recent basinwide initiative to attempt to bring order to the situation around the river Nile's resources and the contested hydrohegemony held by Egypt is the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). NBI has been widely regarded as the initiative with the strongest potential for establishing basinwide framework for cooperation. A framework for this basin is incredibly important in the context of growing population and climate change stressors, which will exacerbate already tense relations between riparians. Homer-Dixon highlights this importance in a river basin that is one of few that has potential to promote armed conflict. 

"the unilateral, state centric approach that the major riparian countries have been pursuing is untenable in the long run"

The above quote was taken from an article looking at the Nile Basin Initiative, focussing on the different actors and highlighting the state centric and selfish approach by most of the riparian nations within the basin. This is what I believe is the main problem with the situation, and something I feel that initiatives won't do much to deter, its a mentality that needs to be changed before any sort of initiative is going to be affected. Riparian states need to be convinced of the shared economic benefits 

from using the resources of the Nile sustainably present and especially in the future. This emphasises the importance of hydrologists and academics to produce these studies. This has worked in the past for example with the Hadejia Nguru wetlands, and Barbier et al. (1991) producing an analysis of some of the economical benefits of the wetlands and also Thompson and Barbier (1998)'s cost-benefit analysis which emphasised the nonsensical nature of large scale irrigation and infrastructure projects on the basins main rivers, due to the downstream costs.

The Nile basin initiative launched in February 1999 with the foundations being layed in previous years as willingness for basinwide cooperation grew. It comprises of a council of ministers (Nile COM), Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) and the Secretariat (Nile-SEC). The NBI has involvement from the World Bank which coordinates International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) and there are two subsidiary action programs for the Eastern and Equatorial Lakes Region. Pressures from involvement of the world bank has led to Egypt shifting its foreign policy over the Nile, threatening a reduction in lending. This for me however, is concerning as it is forced cooperation and not out of true willingness and though it is talking about cooperating, it continues to develop large scale water projects within its borders that threatens the integrity of the Nile its water resources.

In order to develop the full potential of a river it has to be done at the basin scale with consideration of all parties that could be effected. Work by Ashok Swain highlights the need for an Integrated River Basin Management where the whole units can be considered as one economic, ecological and political unit irrespective of state boundaries. However, with the Nile Basin due to its vastness and the differing interests of the riparians a basin wide initiative is likely not to be as effective. The Lower Mekong Basin initiative is another example of a basin which has a lack of basinwide interest in cooperative management. However, in response to this a sub-basin agreement has been made between most of the riparian countries, the Nile could benefit from something like this potentially comprising of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia being the key targets. Swain interestingly brings attention to the fact a basin wide approach could be ineffective due to the varied levels of interest paid by each riparian and that the key riparians should be targeted in order to avoid potential conflict.

"to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilisation of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources" - aim of Nile Basin Initiative

Despite finding this paper very interesting I would criticise certain aspects such as the perceived fix for countries like Ethiopia and Sudan, lacking infrastructure to begin their own large scale water infrastructure projects. Unless these projects have been agreed to by all parties and assessed on a basin wide level I do not think this is a suitable fix considering how past large scale infrastructural projects have disrupted the flow in this basin and also in other african basins. Further to this, I wouldn't say basin wide initiatives are futile, as they consider the interests of smaller less politically powerful countries that still, regardless of size, rely on the basins resources. 

The take-home message from this article and blog post is that the initiative of NBI attempts to develop a framework for basin wide cooperation, which has worked previously in other basins and is suggested as a potential way to avoid conflict by academics such as Savenije (2008) and van der Zaag (2005). Whether it has been effective remains to be seen as it is a long process, however I do agree about the importance of sub basin level agreements between parties that are most effected or with most potential to engage in conflict. The myriad of complexities that the Nile Basin embodies, is likely to continue to be problematic for many years to come, however insight into new ways to deal with these issues are making paths to cooperation.