The Great Renaissance Dam

A very current ongoing area of debate and tension is the prospect of the Grand Renaissance Dam (or the Millennium Dam as it is sometimes referred to). The dam is currently under production and seeks to bring hydroelectric power to Ethiopia by harnessing Blue Nile's waters. Upon completion, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, and as expected Egypt has been strongly against the project as it believes the dam will reduce water temporarily with the filling of the dam and with the effects of long term evaporative losses. Further tho this there could lead to a permanent lowering of water levels in Lake Nasser which on one hand would reduce the evaporative losses from the body of water but will also reduce the ability of the Aswan High Dam to produce hydropower.

Dialogue between concerned Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt has been ongoing for the last 5 years and has been tumultuous at best. Beginning with an International Panel of Experts to review and assess the impacts of the dam, data sharing and collaborative efforts looked to mirror positives of Integrated Water Resources Management, however reports produced by Ethiopia and Egypt ended up differing, in reflection of their interests. In 2013 tensions reached new heights when Egyptian political leaders unknowingly discussed methods on television to destroy the dam whilst discussing the International Panel of Experts report mentioned above with President Morsi. After the meeting Morsi highlighted the embarrassment and promoted "good neighbourliness" however not ruling out conflict in a later speech as "Egypt's water security cannot be violated at all."

After numerous cessations of talks then renegotiating according to some reports an agreement may be reached "on some points" very soon. The most recent talks that have occurred this month, with technical talks taking place the last few days, with reported agreements on studying the impacts of the dam. So after 10 rounds of talks over the past 2 years, it seems that there may be some agreements in principal on the horizon for the project. However, given the up and down nature of talks over the past few years it would be good not to get too optimistic.

This case demonstrates the fragility of relations between the riparian nations, especially Egypt and any country that threatens its water supply from the Nile. It further exemplifies that cooperation is possible but that it occurs over a very lengthy and strenuous amount of time, with conflict still being an outside possibility.

BAR Event Intensity Scale and Basins at Risk

A well known way to categorise the degree of cooperation/competition in a transboundary basin is assigning a level on the BAR event intensity scale. The BAR project was a contribution from UNESCO's International Hydrological Programme and the final product; a database grading all events over the period of 1948-99 was produced by some of the leading academics in the area of transboundary water conflict Aaron Wolf, Shira Yoffe and Mark Giordano. In addition to this, they used the information they compiled to predict the basins at greatest risk of dispute in the near future (5-10 years). I allured to this study in my previous post and thought it required some further investigation.

In creating this intricate database, it involved the compilation and assessment of biophysical, socioeconomic and geopolitical data utilising GIS to determine indicators for future tensions. With all this data and varied sources, the BAR event intensity scale was produced (Table 1).

Table 1. BAR event intensity scale (Source: UNESCO)

The findings from such analysis highlighted the lack of extremes (extreme conflict and extreme cooperation) (Figure 1), that most interactions were cooperative and most mild in intensity, and that the major water related issues are over quantity and infrastructure.

Figure 1. Number events by BAR scale (Source: UNESCO)

Though the data certainly seems to indicate patterns of which this article stresses, I would question a few aspects of their findings and the way they categorise their BAR event intensity. Firstly, they emphasise the lack of conflict in their findings, however though there hasn't been forms of extreme conflict >25% of their events were conflictual of some sort, so it exists, and this number could be even higher if one was to update the dataset for 2015 in the face of Africa's increasing population boom, continuing struggle over resources and impacts of increased climate variability. Another aspect I'd critique is regarding an International Water Treaty as the second highest form of cooperation. As is well known, and demonstrated in some of my previous posts, this does not necessarily mean there is strong widespread cooperation within the basin. In addition to this, as allured to in my previous post, their predictions of basins which are likely to produce conflict in the next 5-10 years (aka 5-10 years ago) have not been entirely accurate, exemplified in the case of the Okavango. 

While frameworks to differentiate between levels of conflict and cooperation such as this one can sometimes be useful, they are based on a number of assumptions that in a lot of cases do not encapsulate the heterogeneity of transboundary river basins.

Water conflict and cooperation literature: A review

An interesting journal article published just recently has scrutinised literature from the past 25 years on water conflict and cooperation highlighting areas that require future investigation and calling for an adjustment to the approaches to studies on water resource conflict. I will discuss a few interesting points it stresses in this blog post.

The article highlights 2 significant waves of literature, while it isnt ideal to categorize the author does actually encapsulate the changing literature on water conflict. Wave 1 starts in the 1990s with the neomalthusian rhetoric of concerns relating water conflict to population, poverty and environmental degredation. Wave 2 begins in the early 2000s initiated this time by questions of climate change and adaptive capacity. Though this is a good way to view the changing paradigms in water resource literature over the past 20 years on Africa, it ignores that there is a significant quantity of literature published before 1980 on water resource conflict.

A second claim made by the article is that the idea of 'basins at risk' is not a fixed but fluid concept. This is a just idea when one considers that Wolf et al. 2003 highlighted that the Okavango basin is likely to see an 'escalation in conflict' in the next 5-10 years. This has yet to materialise and emphasises the dynamic constantly changing and unpredictable nature of basin status.

Another interesting aspect is the common conception in literature that conflict is bad and to be avoided and that cooperation is good. A good example used in the article is the Orange-Senqu cooperation that occured only after conflict via a coop d'etat. This links to the idea that conflict and cooperation occur simultaneously and in a variety of forms, Furlong et al emphasised the contradictory nature of cooperation between states whereby regional peace obscures the subnational violence that could be occuring. Other academics such as Mirumachi and Homer-Dixon also share these beliefs.

This is part of a wider absense of studies on subnational scale conflict or cooperation, obscurred by the focus on interstate relations and general basinwide categorization as being in conflict or cooperative. The article alludes to a need to find a way to intergrate the fascination of potential for interstate conflict with real time numerous and persistent conflcits that exist within states - this is what he suggests as a third wave of more nuanced and sophisticated studies.

As I read this article, I found the critiques outlined to be rather sobering when I consider how I have looked at the Okavango and Nile basins. The extensive one dimensional literature on these transboundary basins have encouraged me to categorize the basin as either in cooperation or in conflict, ignoring both subnational and further aggregate dynamics. Overall, the article makes an interesting read and in my opinion is thought provoking critical synthesis of literature over the past 20 years on transboundary water conflict.

Struggle Over the Nile - Documentary

A very interesting geopolitical outlook on tensions over the Nile's waters. It offers insight into the different positions of each riparian country, their interests and how these conflict. The video is 1/3 videos created in the series by Al Jazeera, however I believe this to be the most informative and relevant.

Sold Up The River?

An interesting piece on hydro power proposals on the Okavango discusses the tradeoffs between domestic and developmental needs and the needs for conserving the rich soon to be UNESCO World Heritage Site that is Botswana's Okavango Delta.

A proposed large scale hydro-electric weir at Popa Falls on the Okavango River. This comes from Namibia's desperate need to develop self sufficient power generation infrastructure, such that they no longer need to import over 50% of their energy from South Africa. As population is fastly growing and there have been some signs of development in the region, demand is increasingly outstripping supply and widespread outages and infrastructural limitations are hampering potential economic growth. Namibia has been exploring this possiblity since 1969, however thanks to public outcry and frequent stakeholder meetings this project has been indefinitely delayed.

The article outlines numerous impacts that could result from implementation of the weir such as

- signficant reductions in water flow and natural variability

- interuption of sediment flow downstream

- migrational routes of elephants and fish disturbed

- inundation of houses, schools, riverine forest leading to loss of habitat and destablising communities

- inundation leading to increased prevalence of malaria and bilharzia

Though alarmist, as the project will unlikely get moving any time soon. It does emphasise the difficulty of a trade off between economic growth needs and preserving ecologically important areas. Written from the perspective of an ecologist, it does make very ambitious and unrealistic claims such as "we need to limit water abstraction to household demand throughout the Kavango Basin." The fact that NamPower with the oversight of OKACOM first produced a feasibility study then invited stakeholder participation in debating matters shows the effectiveness of the Integrated Water Resource Management that occurs in this basin. This project is unlikely to ever occur should the current successful implementation of IWRM continue.

Virtual Water - A Potential Solution?

There are some academics whom posit that the primary reason for the lack of water conflict is due to the economic system of trading basic staple goods (such as wheat) which operate to advantage of water and food deficit countries (Allan, 1997; Le Heron, 1995). What I want to consider in this post is whether it is a viable solution to water shortages within the Nile basin in the future?

A highly influential paper by Allan (1997) certainly makes this claim, highlighting that “more water ‘flows’ into the Middle East each year as ‘virtual water’ than flows down the Nile into Egypt for agriculture” is the solution to the transboundary water issue within the Nile Basin. The paper also goes far to emphasises a perception change is necessary and this will lead to a policy change that will actively implement the idea of virtual water.

Allan makes some really interesting points about perceptions and how this has actively worked against effective policy solutions to water shortage in North Africa and the Middle East. He also goes to define what “sufficient” means to different actors and how varying interpretations has led to a lack of scientific imperative. This provides an interesting framework with which to look at why effective policies have been few and far between in managing the Nile’s resources sustainably. The basic claim he makes is a lack of blue water in North Africa could be accounted for by green water in humid regions which is generally taken for granted. The analysis provided in this paper emphasises the need to look on an international scale, not merely national or basinwide which it criticises its neglect of the market. He highlights that national economies operate within international systems and that transboundary water issues should be considered in “problemsheds” and not just within the hydrological boundaries (watersheds). I believe the key points made by Allan are important, integration and effective use of virtual water could be important in the future for ensuring water and food security within the Nile basin. Instead of large scale irrigation that operates primarily in Egypt, these products could be imported saving substantial amounts of water that would be better used for domestic consumption. Since 69% of water is used for agriculture and only 13% for domestic purposes a shift in the priorities of the Nile’s water towards domestic consumption could resolve insecurity over access to clean safe water especially when in the face of climate change and population growth.

“it is economic systems and not hydrological and water engineering systems which achieve water security for the economies of the region.”

The main issue with an argument such as this one is the neglect of social aspects. By thinking about economical solutions such as with virtual water one ignores the existing reason for widespread agriculture within Egypt: sustaining livelihoods and a rich cultural and historical background of staple production within the region. If virtual water was a potential solution for the Nile issue, who decides who has the right to use Nile waters and who should import to offset the water demands of production? Further to this, why should agricultural production be lowered in priority due to alternatives when technically speaking there are also alternatives to the hydroelectric interests of Ethiopia, such as solar energy which could be feasible in this region. I feel it is optimistic to make the claim that virtual water is the solution to water resource conflict in the future, though I do see its value in offsetting the demands placed on the Nile’s water by large scale agriculture

Nile Basin Initiative

Basin wide initiatives in the Nile Basin have been largely unsuccessful. The recent basinwide initiative to attempt to bring order to the situation around the river Nile's resources and the contested hydrohegemony held by Egypt is the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). NBI has been widely regarded as the initiative with the strongest potential for establishing basinwide framework for cooperation. A framework for this basin is incredibly important in the context of growing population and climate change stressors, which will exacerbate already tense relations between riparians. Homer-Dixon highlights this importance in a river basin that is one of few that has potential to promote armed conflict. 

"the unilateral, state centric approach that the major riparian countries have been pursuing is untenable in the long run"

The above quote was taken from an article looking at the Nile Basin Initiative, focussing on the different actors and highlighting the state centric and selfish approach by most of the riparian nations within the basin. This is what I believe is the main problem with the situation, and something I feel that initiatives won't do much to deter, its a mentality that needs to be changed before any sort of initiative is going to be affected. Riparian states need to be convinced of the shared economic benefits 

from using the resources of the Nile sustainably present and especially in the future. This emphasises the importance of hydrologists and academics to produce these studies. This has worked in the past for example with the Hadejia Nguru wetlands, and Barbier et al. (1991) producing an analysis of some of the economical benefits of the wetlands and also Thompson and Barbier (1998)'s cost-benefit analysis which emphasised the nonsensical nature of large scale irrigation and infrastructure projects on the basins main rivers, due to the downstream costs.

The Nile basin initiative launched in February 1999 with the foundations being layed in previous years as willingness for basinwide cooperation grew. It comprises of a council of ministers (Nile COM), Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) and the Secretariat (Nile-SEC). The NBI has involvement from the World Bank which coordinates International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) and there are two subsidiary action programs for the Eastern and Equatorial Lakes Region. Pressures from involvement of the world bank has led to Egypt shifting its foreign policy over the Nile, threatening a reduction in lending. This for me however, is concerning as it is forced cooperation and not out of true willingness and though it is talking about cooperating, it continues to develop large scale water projects within its borders that threatens the integrity of the Nile its water resources.

In order to develop the full potential of a river it has to be done at the basin scale with consideration of all parties that could be effected. Work by Ashok Swain highlights the need for an Integrated River Basin Management where the whole units can be considered as one economic, ecological and political unit irrespective of state boundaries. However, with the Nile Basin due to its vastness and the differing interests of the riparians a basin wide initiative is likely not to be as effective. The Lower Mekong Basin initiative is another example of a basin which has a lack of basinwide interest in cooperative management. However, in response to this a sub-basin agreement has been made between most of the riparian countries, the Nile could benefit from something like this potentially comprising of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia being the key targets. Swain interestingly brings attention to the fact a basin wide approach could be ineffective due to the varied levels of interest paid by each riparian and that the key riparians should be targeted in order to avoid potential conflict.

"to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilisation of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources" - aim of Nile Basin Initiative

Despite finding this paper very interesting I would criticise certain aspects such as the perceived fix for countries like Ethiopia and Sudan, lacking infrastructure to begin their own large scale water infrastructure projects. Unless these projects have been agreed to by all parties and assessed on a basin wide level I do not think this is a suitable fix considering how past large scale infrastructural projects have disrupted the flow in this basin and also in other african basins. Further to this, I wouldn't say basin wide initiatives are futile, as they consider the interests of smaller less politically powerful countries that still, regardless of size, rely on the basins resources. 

The take-home message from this article and blog post is that the initiative of NBI attempts to develop a framework for basin wide cooperation, which has worked previously in other basins and is suggested as a potential way to avoid conflict by academics such as Savenije (2008) and van der Zaag (2005). Whether it has been effective remains to be seen as it is a long process, however I do agree about the importance of sub basin level agreements between parties that are most effected or with most potential to engage in conflict. The myriad of complexities that the Nile Basin embodies, is likely to continue to be problematic for many years to come, however insight into new ways to deal with these issues are making paths to cooperation.

In stark contrast...

The case of the Nile River is a myriad of complexities, inconsistencies and futile treaties. Unlike the case of the Okavango river there has historically been many treaties of which are still in effect today and affect the ability to conserve and manage the Nile's resources equitably. 

The series of colonial-era agreements that exist on the nile are out of the scope of this blog however two of the most cited agreements that have significant impacts include the 1929 exchange of notes between the British and Egyptian government in regard to use of the River Nile for irrigation purposes. The other important agreement is the 1959 agreement between the Republic of Sudan and Egypt allowing the full utilisation of Nile Waters. The latter agreement is a renegotiation of the 1929 agreement terms. Other riparian states are not included in this and it essentially entitles Sudan and Egypt to unrestricted use of Nile waters. As described previously, this historical context provides unprecedented complications to the Nile situation that is yet to be resolved, understandably other riparian states have contested the status of these agreements.

I have a strong stance on the effectiveness of UN and International Law on the peaceful cooperation of states within a transboundary river basin. I do not wish to discuss in detail the flaws of these international laws and how they are futile in impacting the situation with the Nile Basin however i will briefly describe what they entail and why I feel strongly about them. The 1996 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers was introduced at the 52nd International Law Association conference in Helsinki. The Helsinki Rules assert the rights of all bordering nations to an equitable share in the water resources with "reasonable consideration" of factors such as past uses. It consists of 37 articles spread over 6 chapters and is full of wordy ineffective statements such as "each basin state is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin."

The Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses stems from the spineless Helsinki Rules but with the intention on including both surface and groundwater and being more mindful of increasing demands of water and anthropogenic behaviour. once again the language used in this law has been criticised for the way it has been worded and its controversial nature. McCaffrey (1999) specifically criticises the statement 'in utilising an international watercourse in their territories... take all appropriate measures to preventive causing of significant harm to other watercourse states" and uses the following hypothetical case to illustrate his point that conflict could occur from a state having legitimate uses for a watercourse in its nation that can negatively impact other nations

"Suppose ... upstream State A has not significantly developed its water resources because of its mountainous terrain. The topography of the downstream states on the watercourse, B and C, is flatter, and they have used the watercourse extensively for irrigation for centuries, if not millennia. State A now wishes to develop its water resources for hydroelectric and agricultural purposes. States B and C cry foul, on the ground that this would significantly harm their established uses."

As emphasised by McCaffrey and many others, these international laws are simply not applicable to the heterogenous nature of transboundary river basins, the states involved, past agreements, historical and colonial contexts and many other factors.  

On a more aggregate level the Nile Basin Initiative was introduced as a partnership among Nile riparian states in 1999. I will look at this closer in my upcoming blog post and assess to what extent this has been more useful at coordinating cooperative efforts and moving forward from colonial agreements. 

OKACOM and the Okavango basin

Many highlight the ability of treaties to govern utilisation and reduce conflict potential by fostering collaboration between the riparians of the Okavango basin. However treaties have for various reasons been criticised for their vague and lucid nature, and as a result in a lot of cases have proven to be ineffective at encouraging collaboration between states. This blog post will look at OKACOM and its widely claimed effective impacts on collaborative adaptive management in terms of institutional and ecological resilience. 

A key focus for the parties of the Okavango basin are the environmental needs, and these according to Green et al. (2013) are of higher importance than the domestic needs, the delta rich with wildlife provides a massive source of tourist income, with the region widely being acknowledged for its ecotourist appeal. The threat of development on the river would pose significant impacts on critical sediment transported channel shifting that is essential to biodiversity and fertility. There are several treaties that serve to foster collaboration and sustainable use of the resources of the Okavango. First of all there is the 1994 agreement between the governments of Angola, Botswana and Namibia on the establishment of a Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM). With three delegations representing the contacting parties, the functions of the commission outlined in the agreement states, as an example, "the prevention of pollution of water resources and the control over aquatic weeds in the Okavango River Basin." Whilst the agreement outlines specific tasks to ensure the sustainability of the basin the agreement is sparse and lacking detail and substance. Thirteen years later a similar agreement came into force that establishes three separate branches of OKACOM: hydrological, biodiversity and institutional task forces (OKACOM, 2007). Once more, this agreement emphasises the need for "equitable allocation" of resources, yet thus far has struggled to quantify and allocate such resources due to ongoing demand and supply evaluations and council formations (OKACOM 2010). Beyond this there are other frameworks that operate to encourage cooperation, such as the 2010 Protocol on Hydrological Data Sharing for the Okavango River Basin, which exists to provide accurate information on floods droughts and pollution magnitudes. This aspect is intrinsically linked to OKASEC which feeds back to OKACOM.  What we can understand from this is that there is a centralisation of the agreements and taskforces whom operate for the region as a whole. I agree with academics such as Green et al. 2013 that this is a fundamentally positive aspect to managing the resources within the basin. 

It is important to mention the multi-scalar nature of treaties and fostering riparian collaboration. In the case of the Okavango basin, crucially there is the strong framework of OKACOM, that despite resigning itself to the occasional vague use of words, has been relatively effective thus far at keeping relations peaceful between the countries and honing in the priorities of the basin, namely to environmental protection and the sustaining of ecotourism within the region. However, as I will discuss in upcoming posts, it is the interplay between local, regional and international interests that has enabled OKACOM to so far be successful. It will be interesting to see however, when the allocation regime is established within the region, what impacts this will have on the so far smooth collaborative work that has been done. 

The Nile and Okavango Basins

In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said: “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”

The Nile river of East Africa is the worlds longest river stretching 6,700km and passing through 10 African countries (International Rivers, 2015) [Figure 1.]. An estimated 300 million people live within these 10 basin countries with 160 million of these depending on the river for their livelihoods (El Fadel et al., 2000) [see Table 1]. Since the course of the river Nile stretches broadly speaking from north to south, there is a climatic gradient meaning there are inter riparian differences in climatic conditions (Kameri-Mbote, 2007). The Nile has a rich history and cultural significance, meaning a varied significance of the river to each riparian. Dependence on the Nile is further non uniform, Sudan and Egypt rely almost completely on the Nile for their water resources due to colonial and historical narratives Tafesse, 2001). In the case of Egypt, the ancient claim to rights doesn’t fit exactly the idea of sovereign integrity but its natural historical right is deemed above all the most important for Egyptian interests. Despite this, in terms of contribution to the Nile, Ethiopia’s tributaries supply about 85% of the Nile, which has caused conflict between the two countries in terms of rights (Chatteri, 2002). The intriguing dynamic and narratives of the main countries that use the Nile is the main reason for such interest in this river basin. Is there capacity for cooperation between these countries or are conflicts in interests and perceived rights going to ultimately lead to a future resource war?

Country	Population 1995 (millions)	Population 2025 (millions)	GNP per capita 1996 (US $)	Population below the poverty line (1US$/day) (PPP) (%)	Per capita water availability 1990 (m³)	Per capita water availability 2025 (m³)
Burundi	6.4	13.5	170		655	269
DRC	43.9	104.6	160		359,803	139,309
Egypt	62.9	97.3	1,090	7.6	1,123	630
Ethiopia	55.1	126.9	100	33.8	2,207	842
Eritrea	?	?	?	?	?	?
Kenya	28.8	63.4	320	50.2	636	235
Rwanda	8	15.8	190	45.7	897	306
Sudan	28.1	58.4			4,792	1,993
Tanzania	29.7	62.9	170	16.4	2,924	1,025
Uganda	21.3	48.1	300	50	3,759	1,437

Table 1. Nile river riparians (source: Chatteri et al. 2002)

 Figure 1. Nile River Basin (source: The World Bank)

My second case study is a much less written about but still important river, the Okavango river which flows through three countries (Angola, Namibia and Botswana) [Figure 2.]. With this case study the actors involved are fewer but does this mean the capacity for cohesion and collaboration in sustainable use of this river is enhanced or are things equally as complex as with the River Nile? By analyzing two different sized rivers from two different areas of Africa, we can begin to look at the different factors that influence cooperation or indeed conflict and get a broader yet focused view of water conflict in Africa. Like with the Nile, the Okavango river is essential for sustaining the livelihoods of those that live within the catchment but also for inundation of the Okavango wetlands that sustains rich and diverse wildlife (Ashton, 2000). Both catchments provide interesting dynamics in which will prove interesting to investigate over the coming weeks.

Figure 2. Okavango River Basin (source: radsmithillustration.com)

In my upcoming posts, I will look at international law and multilateral agreements and how far they have gone in encouraging cooperation and cohesion. I will then look at current and future developments on these river courses that could potentially cause conflict.

Before I complete this second post however I would like to state my opinion on something that is regularly brought up in literature regarding past transboundary water resource conflicts. Many academics raise historical facts to explain why future conflict is very unlikely to happen. I personally do not think reasoning such as ‘instances of cooperation between riparian nations outnumbered conflicts by more than 2-to-1 between 1945 and 1999’ (Wolf et al., 2003) can justify the claim that future resource wars are unlikely. Especially when one considers the potential impacts of climate change on precipitation variability and increased PET to name just a few (IPCC, 2015) on river runoff and consequently the human ramifications that result from this. Though just yet, my exploration of literature around this hasn’t been extensive just yet, I would still note that claims such as the one by President Sadat in 1979, could very much be realized.